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CROSSROADS FOR LAW IN AFRICA
Paul 0. Proehl* and
Henry J. Richardson III**
I. INTRODUCTION
This U.C.L.A. Law Review symposium, discussing selected
problems of law in Africa, arrives during a period in American his-
tory when both military and economic isolationism are being openly
considered in the sharp reaction to the abuses of the Vietnam war.
At the same time, probably more information is now reaching the
general American reader and viewer about Africa than ever before.
This growing American knowledge of Africa has been given a
sharper focus in the last few years as a result of the emergence
of a new pride among Afro-Americans who are more and more
openly claiming their African heritage, and forging new ties to
Africa's history, political dilemmas, economic problems, and cur-
rent international role. What was more pejoratively known in the
American media as the "dark continent" is now proudly acknowl-
edged as "black Africa." At last, some headway has been made
toward destroying the pervasive neo-Tarzanian myth that no "civ-
ilization" of consequence existed in Africa, and by implication no
notable social or legal systems, before the coming of the Europeans.
Beginning with Ghana in 1957, Macmillan's "winds of change"
ushered in an era in which nearly forty countries achieved inde-
pendence based on majority rule in little more than a decade, a
process not yet completed because of the desperate intransigence of
South Africa, Portugal and white Rhodesia. Thus, forty new na-
tional legal systems have emerged, each dragging along its own
pluralistic baggage comprised of both the customary and the colo-
nial legal past combined with a host of urgent nation-building and
development priorities. From this ferment some new concepts about
law in Africa have gradually appeared in response to the tumul-
tuous events and sudden demands of independent nationhood. These
concepts will continue to emerge in the process of dealing with
problems of domestic development, intensified by internal impera-
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tives and enormous international pressures. These new concepts
must pilot the developing law of Africa through waters whose charts
inevitably borrow heavily from the customary and colonial legal
heritages, toward destinations that are both contemporary and
African. It is in the spirit of examining a variety of existing and
emerging norms of law, thus contributing to the increasing-but
still far from comprehensive-body of knowledge of what is loosely,
but conveniently, termed "African law," that the discussions of the
legal crossroads in this symposium are greatly welcomed.
The arrival of independence for each state in sub-Saharan
Africa had many significant symbolic meanings. The most im-
portant was the acquisition by Africans from Europeans of ultimate
legislative and executive sovereignty within their own territories.
This new legal situation was especially prized in certain countries
because of the previous repressive abuse of legal process by the
waning colonial powers in their last-ditch efforts to suppress African
efforts to achieve freedom, usually resulting in the proclamation of
"rebellions" and "emergencies," such as the "Mau Mau Rebellion"
in Kenya of 1952-53 and the "Emergency" in Nyasaland (Malawi)
of 1959.
The formal receipt of legislative and executive authority by
each of these governments did not occur in a legal vacuum. Pro-fessor Seidman has identified three sets of claims, interests and
demands which struggle for recognition in an independent African
state: one set predicated upon customary law; another seeking
satisfaction under received law; and a third set making claims upon
the national government in the name of national development.'
Moreover, "Law"-by whatever definition and of whatever origin
-is called upon to respond to the ideology of the independence
or other ruling party,2 and to respond to the need for national unity,
to be done by integrating, with respect to the role of law, the various
heritages of customary law and resolving the tension between re-
ceived and customary law. Further, "Law" was being called upon
not only to regulate the allocation of resources and the provision to
the people of certain desired goods and services,' but more sig-
nificantly to confirm, and create conditions for the achievement of,
those domestic priorities decided by the government as necessary
1 Seidman, Law and Economic Development in Independent, English-speaking
Sub-Saharan Africa, in AFRICA AND LAW, DEVELOPING LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICANCOMMONWEALTH NATIONS 3, 20 (T. Hutchison ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as Seid-
man].
2 Kuper & Kuper, Introduction, in AFRICAN LAW: ADOPTION AND DEVELOPMENT
17-18 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Kuper & Kuper].
8 Seidman, supra note 1, at 22.
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for the long-range development and viability of the state. Some
priorities were dictated by the very need for survival: maintain-
ing the constitutionality and the existence of the nation against
military and personal ambitions or divisive tribal influences; over-
coming the obstacles created by the artificial, colonially contrived
borders and lines of communication of Africa; and surmounting
the linguistic and administrative barriers that reinforce political
frontiers.5 Other priorities were set as positive steps in future
growth: procuring a rapid increase in the gross national product
through capital investment; creating a social infrastructure includ-
ing schools, medical facilities, and all the other desired features of
a welfare society; eliminating pockets of social injustice based on
racial, ethnic, sex or religious differences; and the speedy develop-
ment of an experienced cadre of leaders at all levels, and a literate
population in general.'
As a result, a post-independence African phenomenon was the
felt need of the new governments to use law-as-legislation as the
obvious tool of social engineering to meet the pressing problems of
nationhood presented by independence and to reach development
goals, achievements symbolized by the revolution leading to inde-
pendence.' The suddenness of independence dictated a resort to
imperium as a source of law, especially relative to problems of
economic development.' Not only did the state intervene by means
of legislation in the workings of the national economy, but in other
areas as well, at times by fiat, sometimes successfully, at other
times in failure. In many cases, although reform had had a bearing
on economic development, incursions were made into areas of per-
sonal law in which the price of disruption of long-established cus-
tomary ways exacted a high political price. Such attempts were
made in the integration of laws of descent and marriage.' In the
same fashion, attempting to integrate different customary laws
based on different systems of descent, the state intervened in family
relations. The state attempted to adjust the status of individual
persons, either by refusing or consenting to legitimate foreign legal
provisions relating, for example, to marriage based on a different
4 See Allott, The Future of African Law, in AnucAN LAw: ADOPTION AND
DEVELOPMENT 216, 223-24 (1965).
5 Allott, The Unification of Laws in Africa, 16 Am. J. ComP. L. 51 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Allott].
6 Id. See P.-F. GoNmEc, LES DRorrs AFRIcAms: EVOLUTION ET SOURCES 141-45,
155 (1968) [hereinafter cited as GoNmEc].
7Allott, supra note 5, at 51; Seidman, supra note 1, at 19.
8 Kuper & Kuper, supra note 2, at 17.
9 See Roberts, The Malawi Law of Succession: Another Attempt at Reform, 12
J. An. L. 81, 88 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Roberts].
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religious tradition. Moreover, the new government intervened into
the power and influence patterns on the local level by allocating,
or attempting to allocate, varying amounts of authority between
newly-formed government and party institutions and customary
sources of authority, thus juggling new doctrines of law regulatinglocal behavior with customary doctrines.' A primary concern of
this symposium is the examination of some of these attempted in-terventions and the difficulties involved in doing so by legislative
law.
The desire to accelerate the pace of development, the growth
of national pride and the symbolic fulfillment of national inde-pendence were not the only factors producing this heavy reliance on
statutory law. There has also been the inclination to use legislativepower because it is available and easiest to use, a circumstance
aided by the existence of a strong executive and a subordinatelegislature in many African countries. Also, the making of laws is
one of the things that happens and is supposed to happen in a
capital city. The territory was centrally governed under colonial
rule by legislation and executive decrees, usually from the city thatis now the capital, and this heritage has lingered. The governmental
apparatus is there, and the administrative facilities are stronger
there than in rural areas. And there is a natural tendency to com-pensate for the lack of administrative capacity in outlying regions
through the promulgation of still more laws.'
On the popular level, the passage of legislation fulfills a sym-bolic need. Notification in the government gazette, accompanying
ministerial and presidential speeches, and newspaper coverage pro-
vide a short-run illusion of national progress which redounds to the
credit of the government. This new legislation generally tends tobe elitist in that it is usually preconceived in the capital and may,
with significant variations, not represent the declared wishes of the
majority of citizens, but that which the leaders of the country
thought was suitable for the people. The legislation tends to be aproduct of metropolitan thinking upon the data available, whichis often inadequate, leading to a strong capital-city bias in the
conception of what the legislation should accomplish. Policy-makers
10 Professor Ren6 David emphasized the importance of African legislators and
administrators asking themselves on which human relationships they can act con-structively through legislation and noted the common assumption "that legislation
can be applied in the areas in which it is the will of the legislator to intervene . .. ."R. David, Critical Observations Regarding the Potentialities and the Limitations ofLegislation in the Independent African States 2 (paper delivered at the Conference onIntegration of Customary and Modern Legal Systems, Ibadan, Nigeria, August 29,1964) [hereinafter cited as David].
11 Allott, supra note 5, at 52-53.
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in the capital also tend to be more prepared to generalize regarding
what may in fact be widely varying rural circumstances in their
drive for national uniformity in the name of unity more than those
exercising rural authority.12 Often administrative cadres with pri-
mary responsibility for the success of the legislation are weak.
There has been inadequate ascertainment of the wishes of the peo-
ple or inadequate harmonization of their conflicting wishes, or both.
There has been too little effort made to, explain the legislation in
English, or whatever the received language may be, or in the myriad
tongues that abound in most African nations.
3 This produces, in
Professor Allot's memorable phrase, "phantom legislation"-the
passing of laws which do not have, and most probably cannot have
the desired effect. 4 "Such legislation is an expression not of power,
but of the impotence of power."' 5 In these circumstances, as noted
by the Birminghams, law has little appeal because it is law, and,
since it is "no longer usefully analogized to the rules of a game,
becomes an instrument applied by a controlling minority, often in
spite of significant internal recalcitrance, to transform a traditional
society into an approximation of modern European nationhood."'
6
As discussed in this symposium, the above is illustrated in
Ethiopia, with respect to effective land reform regulations and
the attempt to unify the country by law around Amhara social
ideology by the creation of a special local court system with
limited jurisdiction. It is illustrated in Ghana with respect to at-
tempts to stem migration from rural areas into the cities. And, in
a somewhat different sense, it is illustrated for black people in
South Africa relative to their access to counsel in a judicial system
sharply biased against them. Disrespect for law does not prevent
those in a position to do so from mobilizing and invoking legisla-
tive measures on their own behalf where possible to maximize cer-
tain preferences, as in land litigation in Ethiopia. But in these cases
comprising primarily situations in which law-as-imperium was to
establish the basic preconditions for development, the target au-
diences of the law (those intended to be regulated by the legislation)
12 Id. Gunnar Myrdal, writing from a world-wide though Asian-centered per-
spective, believes that the dichotomy between government and rural population 
in
most, if not all, developing countries is so great that disputes about policies 
and
power within the government take place wholly within an elite group who 
in turn
are watched with resigned detachment or are ignored by the masses of the people.
See G. MYRDAL, THE CHALLENGE op WORLD PovERTY 49-77 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as CHALLENGE].
13 See GONmEC, supra note 6, at 141-45.
14 Allott, supra note 5, at 52.
15 Id.
16 Birmingham & Birmingham, Legal Remedies for Overurbanizaton: the Gho-
naian Experience, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 252, 261 (1970).
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were not sufficiently impressed by the sanctity or attracted by theproffered incentives of the law to act in accordance with the under-lying predictions which had defined the objectives of the legislation.Law-as-legislation in these contexts reveals governmental decisionslacking sufficient perceived authority and internalized consensus onthe part of those on whom its implementation most depends. To
a great extent, "Africa has become a continent of legalisms rather
than legality.""
As Professor Seidman has noted, claims upon the national gov-
ernment and claims by the government on the people, in the name
of national development, are novel to our epoch and are insepa-
rable from social and political transformation.' It is becoming in-
creasingly apparent to African governments that despite elaboratelegislative programs, much of the desired transformation is not oc-
curring. There is a growing awareness among governments andlegal advisers that law-as-legislation has been a very blunt tool for
social engineering, and that much of the legislation designed to
establish preconditions for planning and development has indeedbeen "phantom legislation."'" As this awareness of a present in-
ability to effect social transformation in certain areas is confronted,African governments find themselves approaching or already stand-ing at a crossroads-or more accurately, a fork in the road-posing
the problem of the uses which can and should be made of futurelegislation to establish the requisites for development and progress.Therefore "law in Africa," speaking quite generally, is at a criticaldecision point as to the nature of its future configuration. The
choices are basically two: (1) Law primarily as the enactment of
17 Seidman, supra note 1, at 27. An extreme example of this phenomenon wasNkrumah's Ghana. See Proehl, Book Review, 42 IND. L.J. 277, 279, 285-86 (1967)[hereinafter cited as Proehl].
18 Seidman, supra note 1, at 22.
19 Probably in the forefront of this awareness has been President Nyerere and
the Government of Tanzania. See Allott, supra note 5, at 53 n.2. Another example isthe return by the new Malawi law of succession to a reliance on customary law toproduce a workable system of estate disposition, the government having rejected aprevious plan to revise the whole customary law of succession applicable to Africans.See Roberts, supra note 9. Much of this reappraisal occurs in the form of govern-ment ministerial reconsideration of earlier legislation passed in the flush of inde-pendence after reports from rural areas have indicated its ineffectiveness. In thisconnection law facilities and legal advisers in Africa have become acutely aware ofthe ineffectiveness of legislative and constitutional measures in meeting their pro-claimed objectives. See generally Obol-Ochola, Elopement in Uganda, 3 E. AmR. L.J.117, 139 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Obol-Ochola]; Parnall, Aliens and RealProperty in Liberia, 12 J. AFR. L. 64 (1968); Sawyerr, Discriminatory Restrictionson Private Dispositions of Land in Tanganyika: A Second Look, 13 J. Am. L.3, 27 (1969). For a theoretical Marxist approach identifying the same general prob-lem, see Eorsi, Some Problems of Making the Law, 3 E. APa. L.J. 272 (1967) [here-inafter cited as Eorsi].
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legislation; or (2) principal reliance on other forms of law-making
such as the development of new modes of locally-responsive law
through quasi-legal institutions such as local development and land-
loan banks, cooperatives with expanded powers of dispute-resolu-
tion, authoritative ethical statements by the party in power, the
drafting of easily understood explanatory statements to supplement
the statutes, active en banc interpretations by the judiciary of the
relationship between law and local responsibilities, and a deliberate
refusal to legislate by the central government in certain situations
in favor of the playing out of previously ascertained trends in local
behavior. These options will subsequently be discussed herein. The
degree to which law can be useful to the development of each
African nation in the future, and the degree to which truly national
legal systems will emerge with writs effectively running in rural
areas for questions of social transformation depends on the choice
and how it is implemented. The fact of the crossroads is revealed
by several factors: The inadequacy of commands from the state
legislative machinery in effecting social change; the divergence be-
tween problem-oriented legislative provisions and the actual per-
ception of the problem among the people to be regulated; the
dilemma facing the central government posed by an increasing pop-
ular unwillingness to recognize the legal process as reflecting the
agreed goals of the society; and the question of what additional or
reworked measures are now needed to accomplish the government's
social objectives.20
20 This is not to imply that African governments have been dormant in examin-
ing the effectiveness of their own legal systems. This is far from the case. 
The point
here is that until recently the institutional problem of the utility of legislation 
to
effect social transformation, and the philosophical problem of equating 
law with
legislation at the expense of its qualities as a process extending down to the local 
level
and involving a series of implementing decisions over time, have not been met. 
Much
of the governmental attention to law reform has been to producing 
some kind of
uniform legal system throughout the country in the face of wide variations 
of race,
religion, customary and imported legal traditions, long-standing conflicting 
local
practices, tribal rivalry, and the imperatives of national development. 
The attempts
have generally been towards achieving national unification of the law. The 
primary
factor within the context of this goal has generally been the task of integrating 
or
reconciling the customary law(s) of the country with subsequent legislative law and
colonial legal precedents. This factor forms a broad and recurring theme for 
all law
in Africa. Within the context of this theme arise a multitude of problems, 
most of
which are still unresolved by most African governments in any definitive manner 
but
all currently the subject of much ferment and debate within and without govern-
ments. They include: (1) The basic question of whether customary law is to be
ultimately abolished in favor of legislative law, or whether a system 
of mixed
customary-centralized legislative law is to be retained; (2) the most effective methods
of ascertaining the substantive content of customary law; (3) the wisdom of reduc-
ing customary law to writing in restatements for legislative enactment on either
a temporary or permanent basis; and (4) the criteria by which conflicting custom
is to be harmonized for the purposes of legal integration. For useful recent 
dis-
cussions, see T. VEBEELST, m nDwO An.ICA CusTowARY LAW: Ju-ciAL AD
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As has been implied, the general arrival of African govern-ments at the crossroads occurs in what has been designated as the
"present post-colonial phase" of African legal history." Differentgovernments arrive at this stage at different times, according totheir particular circumstances; a few have perhaps reached it, forexample Tanzania, and are actively engaged in exploring the second
choice.
Realistically facing up to the fact that African nations are atsuch a crossroads will produce a new genre of legal problems inAfrica." Assuming, as it is to be hoped, that the second alternativeis to be chosen, there will be the task of establishing new criteriato appraise legislation hitherto unsuccessful in producing the de-sired social transformation. The establishment of such criteria maylead to a second surge (the first being immediately post-indepen-dence), of a hopefully more informed desire to use law for socialengineering and, in this connection, to use legislation as only oneof several available strategies in the legal process to produce thesocial and political transformation needed for development.
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES FOR ITS ADAPTATION AND INTEGRATION (Occasional Paper No.7, African Studies Center, UCLA 1968); Allott, supra note 4; Seidman, supra note 1;Schiller, Introduction, in AFRICA AND LAW: DEVELOPING LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AFRICANCOMMONWEALTH NATIONS vii (T. Hutchison ed. 1968).The crossroads in law discussed here manifestly does not obviate the aboveconsiderations, but presents the necessity for governments to consider them in adifferent light. It is further an historically more recent phenomenon than the generalproblem of legal integration which was recognized in the waning years of somecolonial regimes and, in any case, became of immediate concern to the new governmenton the stroke of independence. The crossroads is an additional legal dilemma towhich the questions above will relate in different ways according to local circum-stances and policies. For instance, having decided that customary law shall be re-stated and incorporated into legislation, the government then remains faced withthe problem of the effectiveness of that legislation-as-law reapplied to the locallevel of society.'
21 Allott, supra note 5, at 53.
22 It should be noted that the alternatives posed to an African government bythis legal crossroads do not constitute totally an either-or proposition. The choiceis basically between continuing the past over-reliance on legislative and executivecommands from the capital to effect social transformation, or, realizing the in-adequacy of these methods, to rely less heavily on legislative plans and principlesand more on programs of education and persuasion coupled with national and localinstitution building, so that the total system is more consonant with the surroundingneeds and attitudes in the population while still functioning to meet governmentgoals. For instance, Professor McAuslan has noted that any remedies to be proposedin land law must accept a large measure of public administrative control as theframework within which reform is to be made. See McAuslan, Control of Land andAgricultural Development in Kenya and Tanzania, in EAST AFRICAN LAW AND SOCIALCHANGE 172, 180 (Contemporary African Monograph Series, No. 6, G. Sawyerr ed.,1967) [hereinafter cited as EAST AFRICAN LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE]. The questionis not whether to abandon legislative law altogether as a tool of social engineering,but whether 'retaining the concept of law per se as such a tool, the mix betweenlegislative and other strategies should be varied.
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In the South African context, the other side of the coin, the
situation is one of black people giving a last tired reappraisal by
attempting to invoke a legislative right to see whether a miniscule
amount of substantive and procedural justice can be wrung from
an apartheid system. These circumstances are the reverse of those
in countries to the north where governments and their legislation
are judged by wide popular expectations of justice. The general
fulfillment of such expectations is suggested here to be a necessary
condition for the use of law over time to stimulate social trans-
formation and therefore development.23 For if not so fulfilled, all
policies beyond the crossroads risk being passively or actively re-
sisted by much of the population as adverse to or separated from
their vital concerns. The appraisal of legislation in both the South
African and independent African contexts must include criteria of
the perceived justice of that legislation by various sectors of the
people. Such criteria are required not only in gross contexts such
as apartheid-repression, but also in more subtle situations such as
beliefs among the people about the amount of corruption within
the central government. 4
This new genre of problems will differ from those demands on
the law already identified, such as national unity, legal integration
and consistency, and provision of welfare services. One difference
will be that the constituency to be immediately served by restoring
the effectiveness of law will in many cases be the government, be-
cause establishing the preconditions of development, for instance
the reversal of urban migration trends, often gives immediate bene-
fits to no single group in the country but rather antagonizes or in-
conveniences many people. The realization of government objectives
will be the measure of legislative success in achieving these pre-
conditions, as opposed to the meeting of popular demands and the
amelioration of local grievances. In that sense, this new genre of
problems will be largely those of public regulation for the purposes
of state planning. The legal and administrative roots of much of
the present ineffectiveness of African governments in this area de-
23 The problem of the role of law relative to the justice of the effective alloca-
tion of resources, especially economic resources, is by no means confined to the
developing countries and South Africa. It is intensely present in both the United
States and the international community, and presents a crisis for law in both arenas.
See Richardson, Speculations on the Relevance of International Law to the Needs
of Black Southern Africa, UFAHAMU, Spring 1970, at 22, 27-28 (African Studies
Center, UCLA, 1970).
24 Gunnar Myrdal has incisively discussed the effect of corruption on develop-
ment, the distorted attitudes towards it by Western academics, and the necessity of
its elimination to successfully use law as a tool of social engineering. See CmALLENGE,
supra note 12, at 227-42; Myrdal, The "Soft State" in Underdeveloped Countries, 15
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1118 (1968).
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rive from attempts to solve this category of African problems by
applying principles of received European law. In English-speaking
Africa there were few norms of public law received from England
prior to independence, and few have since evolved relevant to
planning functions; particularly missing are procedural statutes de-
tailing planning functions. The ineffective implementation of plans
is augmented by the failure of African governments to assimilate
planning concepts to the ministerial system of government and
public service.25 Centralized regulation and planning enhances the
already strong trends towards elitism in African governments. The
monopoly of knowledge of the requirements of national develop-
ment is held by expatriates and a handful of indigenous leaders,
and those goals and objectives are usually as much imposed by the
government as agreed upon between key sectors of the population
and the government. In the absence of qualitative increases in
literacy, the danger of such over-concentration will remain.26 Miss-
ing in the future, however, will be the former empty assurance of
law-as-imperium, hopefully to be replaced by a new awareness of
the dangers of metropolitan elitism. Law will then hopefully be
seen by those holding effective power as a process of decision-mak-
ing that includes the lowest district officials and that rests on the
perceptions and expectations of the target population as to the
authority of those making the decisions. The continuing task will
then be to adjust the necessities of public regulation for national
purposes to the maintenance of the authority of the legislators and
administrators, in the context of the expectations (hopefully in-
formed) of the populace relative to both, by means which must in
the long run be both extra-legislative and peacefully persuasive. In
turn, that authority will scarcely be maintained without an aware-
ness on the part of decision-makers at each stage of the sources
and functions of law in simultaneously creating conditions for
minimum public order and desired social change, of the values held
by the people which sustain or alter it, and of its creative role in
moving a society towards generally-approved goals by specific and
graduated formulations.27
25 See Seidman, supra note 1, at 36. An additional problem is presented by the
irrelevancy of the cornerstones of English contract law to contracts between gov-
ernment agencies, an integral part of the planning process. Some substitute system
of administration between public enterprises controlled by altogether different normsis needed, such as has evolved in Senegal. The same general question of the ad-
equacy of received contract norms arises in contractual relationships between public
and private enterprises, where foreign private enterprises can often mobilize more
bargaining leverage than can domestic public ones. Id. at 43-44.
26 See Proehl, supra note 17, at 288.
27 Id. at 291. See also M. McDouoAL & AssocIATzs, STUDIs IN WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1960).
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The essays in this symposium well illustrate different pathways
to the same crossroads, and portray situations for which solutions
must be found: (1) The ineffectiveness of public law regulation to
meet a national problem of overurbanization; (2) unsuccessful at-
tempts, or even chronic inability, to diminish the influence of an
aristocracy with vested interests in the status quo, in order to effec-
tively institute land reform as a precondition of development; (3)
an unsuccessful attempt by a ruling ethnic group to impose a dom-
inant and potentially unifying ideology on other ethnic peoples
through the establishment of local judicial institutions to transform
local customary law; (4) an unsuccessful attempt by some whites,
and implicitly all blacks in South Africa, to maintain the common-
law principle of right to counsel with its underlying implication
of equality before the law, in a political, economic, social, and there-
fore legal, context of inequality.
II. THE CROSSROADS IN CONTEXT
In their study of overurbanization in Ghana, the Birminghams
point out that the concentration of the proletariat in urban areas
(although economically productive in the short run) augments its
power to threaten (in certain contexts) underlying development
programs.2" There are harsher methods available, of course, but one
function of law is to provide persuasive methods of regulating
the flow of primarily young men into the cities. The government
has tried four responses to the problem: (1) Regulation of urban
income, both in the government's capacity as the major urban em-
ployer and as holder of legislative authority to determine the na-
tional minimum wage, the savings from both measures to be used for
rural development; (2) dispersion of industry by means of various
incentives to rural areas, although there are demonstrable economic
advantages in urban industrial concentration during the early stages
of growth, but at political cost; (3) rural development financed
additionally by savings from underpaying cocoa farmers for their
crops, with the possibility of this measure having a countereffect,
and accelerating the migration into the cities; and (4) discrimina-
tion against the Lebano-Syrian community by specifically-directed
regulations to restrict their participation in business and employ-
ment, coupled with massive arrests and repatriation of aliens gen-
erally, including Africans, both of which gained urban popularity
for the government.29
28 Birmingham & Birmingham, Legal Remedies for Overurbanization: The
Ghanaian Experience, 18 U.C.L.A. L. RFv. 252, 261 (1970).
29 Id. at 261-69.
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In drawing lessons from the experience of these basically un-
successful government legal and quasi-legal measures, the Birming-hams note that some of these difficulties can be traced to the declinein world cocoa prices.8o In observing Ghana's approach to this
crossroads of law, its experience would seem to serve as a portent
of future difficulties for other African states, especially for those
already showing signs of sustained urban migration, such as Ni-geria, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. In moving away from
over-reliance on legislative regulation and general legal commandsfrom the capital, it would seem necessary for the government to
realize the truth of the authors' observations that (1) all claims on
the country's resources cannot be simultaneously satisfied, yet none
can be ignored; and (2) the ongoing process of urbanization is atthe root of many developmental difficulties, and any solution at the
expense of the already overburdened urban population will only
contribute to the general instability.8 This dilemma would seem
to call for an intensive process of popular education by the gov-
ernment on the nature of the crisis facing the country, especially
as it threatens both urban and rural development, coupled with
surveys of national attitudes by the most accurate means as a pre-lude to new legislative measures and the establishment of new
institutions.
If the task of the law in these circumstances is to provide
measures for peacefully regulating the flow of young men into the
cities, a consensus among a significant portion of these men as to
what inducements would indeed motivate them to remain in rural
areas must be established as a foundation for any further legal
regulation, if such regulation is to escape the list of "phantom leg-islation." The Birminghams also note that legal institutions in-herited from the colonial past apparently have a declining moralforce, a factor in the decline of the respect given to law as law.82This suggests that the second alternative may have a strong sym-bolic dimension. A reformation of certain legal institutions con-
nected with the dilemmas leading to the crossroads to exorcise the
colonial past by instituting procedures, personnel and legal doc-trines that will be perceived as more independently African, might
well have to be linked with the aforementioned process of popular
education and consensus-building. Such a possibility seems more
strongly indicated by the fact that the young men now crowdinginto urban areas are noted as constituting one of the most politically
aware elements of the population. If strong feelings of anti-Euro-
80 Id. at 269.
81 Id. at 269-70.
82 Id. at 261.
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peanism, Pan-Africanism, or other deeply felt attitudes are pre-
sent, these must be taken into account in building a consensus for
the new forms of legal regulation that are required.
Although Professor Singer's discussion of the Atbia Dagnia
of Ethiopia 3 relates to an entirely different factual context, a sim-
ilar dilemma for the future effectiveness of law and legal institutions
is presented. The establishment of the Atbia Dagnia (literally, local
judge), deriving from its history as an Amhara institution, was an
attempt to integrate customary law into the national legal system.
It was part of an overall development scheme ultimately aimed at
creating a unified society in which all persons assumed or submitted
to Amhara social ideology, that of the Emperor. Professor Singer's
empirical exploration of the Atbia Dagnia as one aspect of that
program of legal integration is also a study of the effectiveness of
an attempt at national institutionalization of Amhara legal ideology.
The procedures for appointing the Atbia Dagnia were seemingly un-
systematic and the post never generated much enthusiasm among
potential appointees. The administrative line of authority up through
the Ministry of Justice was unclear. More significantly, the legal
status of the Atbia Dagnia was inconsistently defined by the gov-
ernment, especially as to the scope of its jurisdiction, and its func-
tions as an on-going institution were scarcely, if at all, taken into
account in drafting the Procedural Code. This latter produced con-
flicts of jurisdiction with other legal institutions and wide uncer-
tainties of interpretation. Of the potential number of cases which
could have been brought before it, the Atbia Dagnia heard a de-
cided minority in comparison with other available legal institutions.
Of those cases actually before it, Atbia Dagnias gave decisions
resolving only a minority. These findings rightly lead Professor
Singer to state that there was actually relatively little assumption
of legal authority by the Atbia Dagnia.1
The discussion concludes that the establishment of the Atbia
Dagnia was a positive and thought-provoking attempt at legal in-
tegration. But it is a failure in terms of its actual functioning be-
cause it was an attempt to institutionalize legal values without first
investigating the readiness of various segments of Ethiopian society
to accept the corresponding shifts in local power structures." Pro-
fessor Singer ends by suggesting that an effective allocation of
power and provision of new authority by the central government is
83 Singer, A Traditional Legal Institution in a Modern Legal Setting: The
Atbia Dagnia of Ethiopia, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 308 (1970).
84 Id. at 332.
85 Id. at 333.
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needed to make the Atbia Dagnia work. 6 In terms of the cross-
roads, it seems clear that for this institution to perform its pro-
claimed purpose, further allocations of power and authority must
rest upon accurate knowledge of the attitudes of the local people
directly affected who can determine the success or failure of theAtbia Dagnia by withholding their disputes or actively utilizing it
as a dispute-resolving agency. On the basis of such a survey of
attitudes, some program of local communication and education by
the central government would seem necessary to resolve, where
possible, conflicts between ascertained local attitudes and the pur-
poses of the Atbia Dagnia and, where impossible, to re-evaluate thelatter for alternative approaches-to ask whether the Atbia Dagnia
is worth the inevitable conflicts and attempted circumvention of itsjurisdiction. Also, crucial as a first task, of course, is the resolution
of internal inconsistencies within existing legislation as to the exact
role and jurisdiction of the Atbia Dagnia.
Although Ethiopia's history varies from that of most of sub-
Saharan Africa in that it has never been colonized by an outside
power, the position of the Amhara in emerging as internal con-querors of the national territory make this experience in ineffective
legal integration highly relevant to states where independence-gen-
erated national unity is now being endangered by progressively
emerging group conflicts and rivalries. The Kikuyu-Luo, Lozi-
Bemba, Lango-Buganda conflicts in Kenya, Zambia and Uganda
are significant examples, where dominant tribes generally control-
ling the government are responsible for developing the country and
maintaining national unity. The tool of legal integration by legisla-
tion would seem to be a useful one, but available only where an
adequate local consensus has first been established. Its ineffec-
tiveness in such situations heralds not only the approach of this
crossroads for national law but perhaps also a deeper crisis of de-
velopment and the maintenance of national public order as a pre-
cursor of that development.
Mr. Ream's discussion of the existence of a right to counsel
in South African law3 7 presents South Africa as approaching thislegal crossroads from an opposite direction than do the black-ruled
states to the north. For the latter, the dilemma is, in the context ofindependence-derived development objectives, between a continuing
over-use of the legislative power, which is now confronting the law
of diminishing returns on significant policies, and the establishment
86 Id. at 334.
8T Ream, The Right to Counsel in South Africa, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 335(1970) [hereinafter cited as Ream].
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of new relationships between local attitudes, legal institutions 
and
regulatory legislation. This dilemma most clearly exists 
relative to
the creation of underlying requisites for national development. 
For
black South Africa the dilemma is similar in form and 
is inextrica-
bly linked to the most fundamental precondition for development:
the destruction of apartheid. Development cannot be value-neutral.
One fork in the road is for black South Africans to continue 
to
generally submit to the extensive white-controlled system 
of legis-
lative regulation designed to propagate apartheid and 
stifle black
dissent and development, in the weary hope of finding 
some shred
of substantive justice in incorporated legal principles such as a
right to counsel, at the risk of increasingly losing 
the latitude
to protest or effect change through further restrictive legislation,
especially as the judiciary seems increasingly circumscribed. The
alternative is for black people to abandon existing law 
and take
direct action on the local and national level in revolt in 
order to
abolish the existing apartheid system, so that the subsequent 
rule
of law and the establishment of legal institutions will at least 
have
an equal chance of furthering the development of black 
South
Africa. As is well known, passage down this second road 
is ap-
parently blocked at present by white South Africa's 
capacity for
overwhelming repression and extensive measures of internal 
secur-
ity.38
In this situation, law-as-legislative command has struck 
re-
sponsive chords among the great majority of white South Africans
through its perpetuation of apartheid, in part to protect 
white eco-
nomic benefits. In meeting this responsiveness, however, 
statutory
regulation has set up profound contradictions, notably 
between the
stated separatist beliefs of apartheid and the increasing 
economic
necessity for black workers to be present in the cities. 
There is
thus some resemblance to the dilemmas and contradictions 
occur-
ring in the overurbanization problems of Ghana, the 
Ethiopian-
Amhara attempt to use the device of legal integration to 
perpetuate
a ruling ideology, and the lack of progress in Ethiopian 
land re-
form (in part from the opposition of a vested aristocracy). But the
resemblance is mirrored, with the images completely 
reversed, be-
cause in the latter cases the dilemma in law has been 
produced by
88 The rate of hangings in South Africa is higher than any other 
country in
the world, with the overwhelming majority of the executed being Africans, as are
the overwhelming majority of the prison population, the political prisoners, 
and those
under banning orders. There are a variety of methods whereby 
the South African
government may legally deprive a person of his liberties 
and subject him to a variety
of pains and penalties without a formal charge and trial 
in open court in spite of
some efforts to the contrary by the courts. See Legum & 
Drysdale, A Report on the
Republic of South Africa 1968-69, in AucAN CONTErpoRARY REcoRD 2-48 (1969).
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a proclaimed march towards national development in fulfillment of
mass aspirations, whereas in South Africa it is produced by admit-
ted attempts to retain economic benefits and power for a restricted
group within a legal structure supported by racist repression.
Mr. Ream's essay considers the effectiveness of a legislatively-
granted (there is no written South African constitution) right to
counsel and notes at the beginning that the two main constraints
inhibiting the exercise of this right by black South Africans are
lack of finances to retain counsel and the general limitations of the
ruling apartheid ideology.8 9 By way of useful comparison with the
effectiveness of the analogous right in the law of the United States,
the right is found to be less than absolute, effectively attaching only
when the defendant is in jail. The real question, aptly stated, is
the existence of the right in the face of legislation which is patently
political, such as the Terrorism and Suppression of Communism
Acts.4 The courts have retained a degree of effectiveness in pro-
tecting the right by generally holding that the defendant must have
counsel at trial if he requests it, can pay for it and counsel is ready
and willing, and that he have counsel in capital cases without ex-
ception, to be provided by the state if necessary. There has been
some slight judicial expansion of availability of counsel for de-
tainees and witnesses, leading to the as yet untested implication
that the courts might be willing to soften somewhat the provisions
of internal security legislation. Legal aid programs, moreover, are
currently government-dominated. The last such major independent
program, the Defence and Aid Fund set up to defend those charged
with political crimes, was disbanded in 1966 under heavy govern-
ment attack. 1 Mr. Ream concludes that this limited right is ineffec-
tively protected and that most prosecutions are probably conducted
without counsel available to the defendant.4
The South African situation presents law in Africa and else-
where with what is ultimately its most profound question: Can law
be relevant in accomplishing revolutionary social change, or must
there come a point when those participating in the legal process
have to realize that their skills and systematic approach are ir-
relevant until some future time when more cataclysmic political
and military forces have established a new public order that calls
for regulation and institutionalization?
89 Ream, supra note 37, at 335-37.
40 Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, 6 REp. S. Ani. STATS. 781 (1965); Suppression
of Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950, 6 REP. S. AFR. STATS. 71 (1965).
41 Ream, supra note 37, at 352-53.
42 Id. 353-55, 357-58.
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Professor Dunning's discussion of prospects for land reform
in Ethiopia, and his conclusion that there really has been no land
reform in practice,43 again presents a similar crossroads for the
continuing effectiveness of law. Added significance is given by the
fact that land reform is considered a near-universal precondition
for sustained development in most developing countries. As Myrdal
points out, the core of this issue is the question of the degree of
equality between the governing elites and the masses of the so-
ciety.4 Over time, the profound implications of the land issue in
terms of needed social reform in perhaps the majority of African
countries may approach those in South Africa.
After considering contemporary land tenure systems in dif-
ferent regions of the country, and the relationship of the traditional
practices of tenure and tribute to land reform, Professor Dunning
discusses recent legal and administrative developments within the
government with respect to land reform as a general objective.
45
To be successful, land reform measures must be connected with
tax reform and must include measures sensitive to regional and
even provincial variations in traditional systems of land tenure,
such as the payment of tribute traditionally confirming and pro-
tecting the rights over land in possession of the tribute payer. Until
the present decade, land reform as a weapon for achieving economic
development and social justice was not officially considered in
Ethiopia. There were significant missed opportunities. The new
Civil Code drafted in the late 1950's contained "only the mildest
hint of reform" of one northern tenure system. Otherwise during
that period, nationally there was almost no attention paid to the
subject, including the Five Year Development Plan for 1957-61."
7
However, the abortive coup of 1960 led to a more serious study
of land reform measures, beginning with a Land Reform Commit-
tee which tackled, inter alia, the problem of agricultural 
tenancy.4 8
The assumption in the Civil Code, contrary to Ethiopian reality, is
that an agricultural tenant and the landlord are in a roughly equal
bargaining position. The Committee made several very mild pro-
posals for reform in favor of the tenant, but the requisite legisla-
tion was blocked from enactment by the landowner-dominated
Senate. 49 The Second Five Year Development Plan was more pre-
43 Dunning, Land Reform in Ethiopia: A Case Study in Non-Development, 18
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 271, 306 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Dunning].
44 CHALrLFaE, supra note 12, at 55, 105-09.
45 Dunning, supra note 43, at 277-89.
46 Id. at 278.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 279-80.
49 Id. at 281.
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cise on land reform policy than the first; specific goals and detailed
suggestions were proposed.50 Currently none of the goals have been
achieved, but action has been taken on the recommendations on
administration, principally the creation of a Ministry of Land Re-form and Administration. Also some tax reform legislation was
enacted; though of uncertain practical importance, the legislationdid simplify some systems of land tenure and taxation. The elimina-tion of the tax-in-lieu-of-tithe, a practice highly favorable to land-lords, was potentially significant for land reform and was in fact a
measure of tenancy reform. But with this one exception, land andincome taxation in Ethiopia have not been particularly reformist in
character. 5'
Professor Dunning notes that rights over land play an im-portant part in maintaining the current political system, including
the distribution of land grants to the political faithful, a practice
the new Ministry, for political reasons, has been unable to con-trol. 2 Most of such grants have gone to non-farming military
officers, civil servants and provincial and district governors, in spite
of the official policy that every53 landless Ethiopian who wishes tofarm will receive half a gasha of land. The favored grantees thenlease the granted land to impoverished cultivators. The former
oppose any change in the status quo. It is no surprise that govern-
ment land and tax policies have often been the focal point of armed
rebellions by peasants. The balabat's local authority has been also
somewhat undermined by the central government; land reform
would further do so. The heavy representation of balabats in Par-liament leads to the expectation that Parliament itself will impedeland reform. The sovereignty of the Church over vast church landsis another on the list of substantial political obstacles to land
reform.
The Third Five Year Plan of 1968-73 primarily restates the
unachieved land reform objectives of the Second. The need for
"vigorous policies of land reform" is regarded as evident if progressin agrarian reconstruction and development is to be made, and vari-
ous measures are suggested.54 "Disheartening results" were can-didly admitted and attributed to "lack of policies" and "inadequate
organization."55 These seem to be off the mark: Professor Dunning
concludes that the lack was in a failure of legislative approval, the
50 Id.
51 Id. at 282-85.
52 id. at 289.
58 Id. at 290 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 286.
55 Id. at 287.
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requisite funds, and the requisite push at the top levels of govern-
ment. The failure at the national level to make significant progress
on land reform has also had an influence on other programs in which
land reform might play an important part, especially the country's
most promising regional development project.56
Professor Dunning notes that land reform is related to na-
tional development in that modernization of the peasant agricul-
tural sector is necessary for national economic development.57 Such
transformation requires at least some implementation of land re-
form measures, though the last, if not strictly proven, rests on
highly plausible assumptions. Reform of the tenure system and
tenancy reform are probably economically beneficial. Insecurity
from lack of accurate land measurement and the prevalence of land
litigation are also assumed to be subject to alleviation by certain
policies, thus leading to greater modernization. Reform of the gov-
ernment land grant system may also have a bearing on peasant
modernization, but it is politically unrealistic to hope that land not
meeting development conditions could be reclaimed from present
holders, such as military officers. The extent of large landholdings
is unknown but relevant, and no economic case for redistribution
has yet been made, nor even seriously considered. Generally, the
Ethiopian leadership does not seem to have adopted, formally or
informally, any clear set of social or political objectives regarding
land toward which the nation can work, but rather limited isolated
steps to modify past patterns have been taken.58
As one cause of this sluggishness, Professor Dunning suggests
that the government leadership simply misjudged its own effective
constituency of landowners, who apparently have reacted more
vigorously against the idea of even mild land reform measures than
was anticipated.5 9 Even mild land reform is a highly political act,
and in Ethiopia today serious political pressure for such reform
does not exist, especially not from peasant organizations or their
representatives. The past and present work of the Ministry of Land
Reform and Administration is useful to develop the knowledge of
field conditions and trained, perceptive administrative manpower
to plan, justify and implement measures of land reform; yet, all
this is only preliminary. The Ministry is not in a position to take
serious action on its own, as preference has been given to reforms
requiring legislation, much of which is unlikely to be enacted, rather
56 Id. at 287.
57 Id. at 293.
58 Id. at 304.
59 Id. at 306.
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than to other means of reform. Executive reforms, such as altera-
tion of the government land grant system, are inhibited by substan-
tial current or potential opposition within the executive itself.
Intensive domestic political pressure, in turn contingent on a
wider political evolutionary process not yet begun, must develop
for progress to be made. 0
The resemblance of the Ethiopian example in land reform at
the crossroads faced by law and legal institutions, to that in South
Africa is significant. In both cases executive action has substan-
tially prevented the occurrence of a precondition (almost absolute
for South Africa, perhaps not quite so for Ethiopia) of long term
development for the masses of society. In South Africa the legisla-
ture has cooperated in this prevention as may well that of Ethiopia.
In both cases a pervasive controlling minority is using the existing
allocations of power, wealth and other kinds of influence to prevent
law, among other tools, from being used as an instrument of social
reform and development. In Austinian terms, however, the South
African government is relatively united for the moment on the
legal commands it gives relative to the status of black people
through both legislative and executive channels, whereas there is a
conflict and apparent confusion on land reform in Ethiopia. 61 In
both cases, there is a distinct temptation to assume that this fork
in the road may in fact be a trident, with the third alternative being
to abandon hope of any legal solutions to such profound problems,
leading those advising lawyers and others committed to legal pro-
cess to counsel them to either await or to go out and organize the
needed revolution. Subsequently law would re-enter the picture as
the handmaiden of the expected new progressive public order.
The exhilaration of this tempting assumption is somewhat
dampened by the realization that such a glorious but desperate
remedy might be in fact recommended for a great many legal
problems equally profound, and that it is rarely certain that the
law and those committed to it, as a process of authoritative deci-
sion, have exhausted all of its remedies for a given problem until
solutions have, in fact, been prescribed by recognized law-givers
but found, after diligent effort, to be unrealizable. This is different
than foregoing the prescription of legal remedies altogether, al-
though the temptation to do so in the South African context is
overwhelming. The question of when those committed to the law
as a tool of development and justice in good faith can give up in
favor of wholly justified but, in the domestic context, extra-legal
60 Id. at 307.
01 See Kuper & Kuper, supra note 2, at 15.
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measures is probably unanswerable by a sweeping rule. For our
purposes here, however, we shall stubbornly assume that the time
to do so, though probably close, has not yet arrived.
III. THE PARAMETERS OF THE CROSSROADS
In reflecting on the dilemma of the crossroads presented to
lawmakers in certain areas of African law suggested by these
essays, all available predictive signposts must be located. One such
signpost is that this crossroads is not solely a crisis in the effective-
ness of statutory legislation per se, but also may encompass con-
stitutional prohibitions and provisions as well. The public policy
of Liberia has been consistently that aliens (non-Africans) should
be absolutely prevented from owning real property within its
borders, as expressed in article V, section 12 of the Liberian Con-
stitution.6" Yet, despite this provision, aliens have been permitted
and presently do enjoy significant interests in real property, pri-
marily long-term leaseholds, that are pervasive even though they
are called something other than "fee simple" estates. The constitu-
tional prohibition as it is presently construed is ineffective for its
intended purpose, since aliens in fact have the use of and control
over large tracts of Liberian real estate."3 If their activities are
controlled at all, it is by means of government agencies enforcing
sophisticated regulatory provisions. What the prohibition has pre-
vented are small purchases of land for residential and for small
business purposes.64 In this way the constitutional provision may be
a detriment to development, especially of the middle commercial
sector of the economy. Further, the existence of this crossroads
confronting an African government need not be strictly confined to
the present historical moment. The anti-alien policy is long-stand-
ing in Liberia, a country independent for over a century. Yet, the
ineffectiveness of the constitutional prohibition has evidently not
led to pertinent reform of the legal process to achieve the social
objective in actuality.
As previously defined, the two basic alternatives facing Afri-
can governments are these: (1) To continue to attempt social and
political transformation by means of additional policy-responsive
legislation from the central government, at the risk of diminishing
returns in accomplishing social objectives; or (2) to develop new
relationships between "modern" central government-directed insti-
tutions and the national views of policy-makers, on the one hand,
62 1 LIBERIAN CODE 0or LAWS 3, 18 (1956).
63 See Parnall, Aliens and Real Property in Liberia, 12 J. AeR. L. 64 (1968).
" Id.
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and local institutions, customary law and practice, and the actualperspectives of that part of the population that is (according to theissue) the target of measures of social transformation on the
other. These, in other words, represent alternatives as to the appli-
cation, invocation, appraisal and termination of legally-expressed
national policies. Both alternatives presuppose essentially consis-
tent outcomes of recommendation and prescription of social policyby means of legislation or other legal expression, i.e., that thegovernment has resolved its internal conflicts in general terms andhas decided upon the policy that should be followed except for
problems of implementation and enforcement.
As it is hoped that governments will move in the direction of
the second alternative, some possibilities for the necessary new
relationships between policy-makers and popular perspectives canbe suggested. These suggestions should not be taken as directives
to African governments to remedy deficiencies in the capacity oftheir legal processes to effect social transformation, but rather as
an indication of the range of possible options-the choice of the
route out of the crossroads. Such options are by no means mutually
exclusive, and their availability singly or in combination will de-pend upon the particular policies and circumstances of eachgovernment. The options, however, must all be considered in light
of the previously suggested efforts by the government to use the
most accurate possible techniques to ascertain the relevant atti-
tudes among sectors of the population to be subjected to regulation
for development purposes.
One such option, for a new relationship between central legis-lative and local administrative or judicial institutions, lies in in-
creased government education of the population at the local level
as to the aims, purposes, and strategies involved in building the
nation."5 Perhaps the outstanding example of this option in prac-
tice is the Arusha Declaration with the accompanying TANUdocuments on the meaning of socialism for national development
issued in Tanzania." Essentially party declarations, both written
and inspired by President Nyerere, of ethics and goals lying some-
where between political exhortation and law, these documents aredesigned to educate all the people of the country as to the pur-poses and programs of the government within a general philosophi-
cal framework and to clarify national goals in easily understood
terms. In doing so they aimed at, and evidently have created, a cer-
65 See GONMEC, supra note 6, at 146, 156.
66 The Arusha Declaration is reprinted in 3. NYE~m, FzRxwom Ams Socuxm
231-50 (1968).
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tain receptivity to legislation, executive orders, and the establishment
of local development institutions such as Ujamaa villages which
were subsequently instituted. 7 A primary advantage of this form
of communication and education is the visible coherency of social
aims and strategies which give the population some idea of what to
expect in the future and why. Certain principles of the Arusha
Declaration have been incorporated into the Tanzanian Constitu-
tion, while the rest remain in the form of TANU documents widely
disseminated throughout the country." Similar government state-
ments of an ideology of social, political and economic development
exist in Zambia with the principles of Humanism and in Uganda
with the Common Man's Charter.6
As either a supplement or alternative to legislative regulation,
party statements in an African one-party state may well be a prime
factor in alleviating the tendencies towards alienation of the popu-
lation from the government in times of stress brought on by rapid
social change. The authority of the government is strengthened,
seemingly, by the policies being set out at length and supported by
arguments and information, while the prestige of the government
is not directly called into question by making strict adherence to
those principles a matter of law to which violation the State must
react. Coherent explanatory party statements may serve a similar
function outside of the context of a coherent social ideology. Such
was the case in Malawi in 1967 when the government decided to ban
mini-skirts. The communication of this ban was by means of a
Party Directive signed by the President as Life Chairman of the
Malawi Congress Party, with an explanatory statement, posted
prominently in public places, warning that commercial establish-
ments which did not ban mini-skirted women from entering would
be closed under the President's standing legislative authority to do
so "in the public interest," and that European women who did so
would be subject to deportation under the President's standing
powers to make such an unappealable decision under the Immigra-
tion Act." The Party machinery throughout the country, especially
the women's groups, declared their full support to the President
67 Cf. id. at 249-50, 385-409; Rahim, Legislative Implementation of the Arusha
Declaration, 4 E. Asa. L.J. 183 (1968); Tordoff, Provincial & District Government in
Zambia, 7 J. ADuIm. OVRSEAS 538, 545 (1968). But for difficulties in this process
and resistance to implementation, see Sawyerr, Discriminatory Restrictions on Private
Dispositions of Land in Tanganyika: A Second Look, 13 J. AYR. L. 2, 23-27.
68 Rahim, supra note 67, at 183.
69 See K. KAUNDA, HuMANisM iN ZAmBIA AND GuIDE TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION
(1969). For an accurate summary of the Common Man's Charter, see 6 Am. Ra-
SEnCH BuLL. 1481-83 (1969).
70 3 LAws OF MALAwI, ch. 15:03 (5)(1)(a)-(5)(4) (1968).
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in his determination to eliminate the wearing of such clothing.
The police, however, were in an ambiguous position, since one does
not feel comfortable ignoring a party directive in a one-party state
and yet police powers did not include statutory authorization to
enforce the mini-skirt ban. A few arrests were made on vagrancy
charges, but generally police contented themselves with taking
names and addresses of offenders. The point is that this method of
regulation was highly effective, though its substantive content may
be debated, especially by men.
Social regulation by party statements and directives in a
one-party state where, in contrast to the Eastern European orChinese experience, the party is generally expected to play far lessthan an absolutely controlling role, would seem to suggest an origi-
nal African contribution to producing a new jurisprudence based
on alternative methods of communication between government andpeople for the greater understanding of both.71
In connection with the above, a second option presented is the
wide dissemination of brochures, manuals and guidebooks clearly
explaining to the people the purposes behind key development legis-lation. In other words, the drafting of complementary documentsfor a lay public as a needed adjunct to legislation. This techniqueis already in operation in Eastern Europe, and analogous "books of
authority" have been used in England and "coutumiers" in Europein the period preceding codification. 72
A third option is for the country's High Court to assume an
active guiding role towards the judiciary by issuing interpretations,
advisory opinions, and en banc memoranda which seek to harmo-
nize judicial and executive policy. In other words, the High Court
would act as more or less the authoritative intermediary between
the courts and the government, interpreting the relationships be-
tween the broad social policies of the country and the law. Thisjudicial leadership role is currently being played in Eastern Euro-pean countries, and variants have been suggested for the African
context to ensure that courts are responsive to national social policy
71 The Church in Catholic countries has often played a similar though more
rigid role in defining "public morals." But despite its new liberalism in some coun-tries, notably in Latin America, the similarity is tenuous. Its historic extranationalties to Rome, the growing uneasiness over its frequently pervasive behind-the-scenesinfluence on government policy while lacking public accountability, its uncertaincommitment to national development, its frequent control of large amounts ofproperty and alliance with defenders of the status quo, and the ongoing Westernpolitical tradition of separation between church and state would seem to weaken
any historical analogies to the party in African one-party states.
72 David, supra note 10, at 10.
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but within the rule of law.73 The court would not be blindly legiti-
mating executive policies but, to the extent that those policies come
to be expressed in authoritative communications, would seek to
convey their full implications to inferior courts and to anticipate
possible legal questions involved in maintaining judicial interpre-
tation as a process relevant to national development.
In Eastern Europe, subsequent to the adoption of various legal
codes, court practice is seen as developing law to breathe life into
the code by interpretation and analogy.74 Supreme courts have the
task of analyzing court practice throughout the country by a
variety of techniques: advisory opinions (non-binding on lower
courts), decisions on principal matters (binding), and directives of
a politico-legal nature (binding) .7 The conflict between the twin
social needs for stability and change is thus resolved. Such analysis
by the high court could and should be done in close consultation
with law faculties and legal research centers within the country.
6
But as Mr. Justice P.T. Georges of Tanzania points out, in contrast
to Marxist doctrines animating a communist state, TANU doctrine
does not seek to embrace and direct the whole range of human
activity.77 Therefore the scope of such advisory opinions that would
be handed down by a high court in an African socialist state would
almost certainly be less comprehensive. The courts generally must
take the lead in making themselves more sensitive to national
development policy in order that:
[A] public opinion will gradually be created, permeating throughout
the party that the courts must be preserved because of the indis-
pensable role which they play. The leaders at the top realise it and
often stress it. But the task demands more than the occasional pro-
nouncement. For these reasons I see no harm and much good in party
membership by members of the judiciary and the use of opportunities
which membership offers to show a positive interest in helping the
process of rapid national development and to stress the importance
of the courts in the achievement of that goal.
78
A fourth option consists of an increased frequency of delib-
erate government decisions to withhold legislative or executive
action affecting public behavior in favor of an expanded effort to
ascertain the relevant trends of belief and behavior in the society,
and then, if possible, to rest future government action on the play-
73 Eorsi, supra note 19, at 274-76.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Georges, The Court in the Tanzania One-Party State, in EAST AFRICAN LAw
AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 22, at 26, 28.
78 Id. at 45.
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ing out of these trends and not on their manipulation by legislative
enactment. This would seem especially applicable to criminal law
situations. For instance, elopement in Uganda was disappearing as
a social activity until, by making it a criminal offense in the Penal
Code, it was revived to the accompaniment of manifestly increased
conflicts and tensions. The situation was not aided by the apparent
inaccuracy of the transcription of the offense from customary law
into legislation and by the difficulty of distinguishing this offense
in the Code from that of adultery. 9 In this connection, remnants of
the repugnancy doctrine held over from colonial times in the legal
systems of independent African states (where customary law isjudged by constitutional law and legislation from the central gov-
ernment, instead of by received colonial law) and other internal
conflicts rules must be reexamined to see whether their applications
are useful or detrimental in the development process."0 Also, recon-
sideration might be given to the expanding, and possibly over used,
governmental practice of attempting to deter each violation of
development related public regulatory statutes by attaching severe
penalties usually reserved for strictly criminal offenses.
A consideration of the range of options available to govern-
ments which choose the second fork out of the crossroads raises
the question of the characteristics of the body of law that will hope-
fully emerge in each country as a useful tool for its develop-
ment. This question has often been posed in terms of legal integra-
tion: Will the country succeed in evolving a single unified legal
system applicable to everyone, and if so, what will be its key fea-
tures? This question has been referred to more generally by
Professor Ren6 David, inquiring whether a national "common law"
of African states will evolve along the lines of a "modern jus
gentium."'' He concluded that such an evolution may well occur,
similar to the development of Roman law, under the informed in-
fluence of national governments which would have to take account
of current customary law and practices, modernize them, and thus
create a new synthesis.8" It is unnecessary here to set out all the
79 Obol-Ochola, supra note 19. In this connection Professor David has strongly
recommended that African legislatures voluntarily and consciously ignore activitiesin certain institutions and areas of life where conflicts are worked out by formal
or informal means. See David, supra note 10. This strongly implies a propensity to
retain, not supersede, customary institutions. A related suggestion has been made
to give local courts generally broader powers of conciliation and arbitration and
even powers to decide disputes ex aequo et bono under broad legislative policies.
See Eorsi, supra note 19, at 280.80 See Sawyerr, Internal Conflict of Laws in East Africa, in EAST A,'ascAN LAW
AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 22, at 110, 134-38.
81 David, supra note 10, at 5.
82 Id. Perhaps the most useful discussion of national unification of laws in
Africa is found in Allott, supra note 5, at 61.
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considerations involved in modernizing customary law; some of
these have been previously noted,83 and much of the resolution of
such problems depends upon the conditions and imperatives in each
country. However, it is relevant to peer down this path from the
crossroads to see whether the adoption by African governments of
the second alternative to meet their dilemma in law may necessarily
lead to the evolution of some kind of "common law."
In asking whether such a new common law will emerge in
African nations, we must ask by what modalities and agencies it
will emerge. Law is a process of authoritative decision by con-
stitutive and public order decision-makers, and a new common law
presupposes its arrival as an outcome of this process. Its arrival
will be produced, if at all, by certain highly articulated strategies
on the part of decision-makers who act on the basis of their own
attitudes and perspectives to meet various objectives established
by the government or otherwise arising out of the legal process or
the values held by the people of the country. These strategies will
be carried out using value-resources, such as power, wealth, respect
and rectitude, within the context and procedures of various arenas.
To establish the plausibility of the evolution of a new common law
in African states, these factors must be briefly considered relative
to background conditions there.
The common law in England emerged when the King's courts,
in order to establish their independence of Parliament, undertook
to interpret legislative enactments according to their own prece-
dents and derived principles. Ius gentium emerged when the law
applicable to relationships between people from different non-
Roman communities in the Roman empire replaced the traditional
Roman jus civile because it was more effective as legislation. 4 One
condition in both instances for such an evolution was a consistent
general philosophy and vantage point from which to interpret dis-
putes and resolve questions of law as they arose. In other words, a
body of perspectives shared by decision-makers in a form coherent
enough to produce successive decisions over time, having a princi-
pled relationship to each other, was necessary. This precondition of
arena, perspectives, and strategies was furnished in England by a
strong local judiciary, whose judges were conscious of their role in
developing a body of law, which they did in part by gradually
eliminating a body of local custom as undesirable.15 Do such condi-
tions exist in Africa?
83 See note 20 supra.
84 Id. David, supra note 10, at 5.
85 Id.
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Able and trained local judges are still in very short supply.
When competent judges do emerge on the local level, they are
often transferred to the capital to work for the central govern-
ment or promoted to a high appeals bench. Generally speaking,
there are a slowly increasing number of capable magistrates
filtering into judicial systems from overseas and local law schools,
but their presence is not uniform throughout Africa nor through-
out any one country, with the exception of Nigeria and two or
three other countries with pre-independence traditions of Africans
training for the bar. This difficulty is complemented by the lack of
a strong national bar or, as is generally true in Southern Africa,
expatriate domination of the bar. 86
The lack of a capable cadre of local magistrates and a strong
bar raises doubts about the emergence of the necessary body of
coherent principles and perspectives to be applied by the localjudiciary. There is currently a serious problem in the relationship
between precedent and the application of principles to disputes to
produce over time a coherent body of judge-made law. First, most
precedents, especially in areas of commercial law vital to the pri-
vate enterprise sector, date back to the received colonial law in the
form of antiquated statutes and decisions dictated by an arbitrary
cut-off date. Customary law is generally limited in resolving many
questions arising, and that will increasingly arise, out of the mone-
tary sector of the economy, such as those concerning contracts for
the sale and delivery of large quantities of goods on a commercial
basis, though in many cases it continues to be invoked and locally
preferred for small transactions between individuals. Enough time
has not passed for an adequate body of local written precedent to
emerge as available to local courts to apply to these and other
kinds of disputes before them.87 Moreover, oral precedent seems to
be of limited nation-wide utility, relinquishing in repeatable pre-
cision over the long term that which it gains in flexibility over the
short term. And even if sufficient time has elapsed, we have noted
that the basic legal policy of the relationship between local custom-
ary law, received law and central government statutes has not yet
been decided or clarified in most African states. The situation in this
respect is one of ferment, and the judiciary does not have the
86 See generally Allott, Judicial Precedent in Africa Revisited, 12 J. AR. L. 3,
3-4 (1968); Carey, The Law Society Seminar: A Forward Look, 1 E. AFR. L. REv.
102 (1968); Hodgin, Proposed Changes in Legal Education in Uganda, 6 E. Am. L.J.
152 (1970) ; Scotton, Judicial Independence and Political Expression in East Africa-
Two Colonial Legacies, 6 E. AiR. L.J. 1 (1970); Twining, Social Justice and the Law,
in EAST AFRICAN LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 22, at 278.
87 See Seidman, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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strength to act alone through its own decisions to resolve the
dilemma by defining that relationship. Thus, without such a clarifi-
cation of legal objectives, shared by the judiciary relative to that
relationship, the vital consistent general philosophy and vantage
point needed as a basis from which to interpret questions of law
to provide principled precedent for similar questions would seem to
be lacking. Likewise, if such a philosophy is agreed but the people
continue to refer most of their disputes for resolution to alternative
legal institutions that do not act under the same principles, the
emergence of a new common law would seem thwarted by the
refusal of the population to recognize as authoritative such deci-
sion-makers, philosophy and principles of dispute-resolution. This
is the situation with the Atbia Dagnia in Ethiopia, where those
local courts, though sharing a general philosophy and vantage
point, are no more than institutionalized legalisms.
An additional consideration relating to strategies, objectives,
arenas, and decision-makers and their perspectives, is that for
several classes of local disputes on which authoritative decisions
must be made, many African states are not committed to resolving
them within a precedent-producing judicial framework. Rather,
resolution is to be sought within an administrative context where
the decision-maker is deliberately given wide discretion to solve
problems and implement broad policies while being only lightly
restricted by specific principles, past decisions, or the requirement
to coherently justify in writing the reasons for his action. In this
setting judicial review would tend to be limited to questions of
fairness and to have increasingly restricted opportunities to reverse
such a decision on substantive grounds. The comparative ineffec-
tiveness of judicial review may well be due, in English-speaking
African countries, to the adoption of a system of administrative law
developed in a country without a written constitution that includes
no requirement that administrative officers give reasons for their
decisions, and that rests on a strong tradition of rectitude in public
life. 8
The growth of such an administrative apparatus seems to be
an inevitable concomitant of any land reform program, as illus-
trated by the experiences of Kenya and Tanganyika, 9 and by the
still feeble tendencies in Ethiopia. Since most African states have
already or must in the future confront the question of whether
current patterns of land usage, tenure and tenancy are adequate
88 Id. at 66-68.
89 McAuslan, Control of Land and Agricultural Development, in Kenya and
Tanzania, in EAST AnucAN LAw AN SociAL CHAwGE, supra note 22, at 180.
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for rapid national development and since questions concerning
rights in land touch the local peasant and the majority of the
population most intimately, the removal of this category of disputes
from judicial consideration, as the state assumes a greater degree
of control over the land, would seem to be a major blow to the
emergence of a new common law. Further, there is some indication
of local distrust in some countries of lawyers' intrusion into land
questions."° These questions have traditionally been regarded as
economic or political problems, to be resolved as such, with the
result that resistance occurs to the introduction of law as a basis
of decision. 91 Additionally, land in Africa has, with few exceptions
in "white-settler" areas, traditionally never been a saleable com-
modity, but rather conceived of as belonging to all and generally
available to those who need it and would use it.92 Rights of aliena-
tion and allocation accordingly vested generally in a central
authority figure for the common good of the clan or tribe. This
tradition is generally being perpetuated by African governments in
vesting title by statute in the Head of State for the benefit of the
people, precisely in order to retain state control over its occupancy,
usage, consolidation and disposition, as opposed to allowing these
factors to be controlled by market forces.93 Such a sustained at-
tempt to remove land from the commercial sector by means of
administrative institutions denies a capable judiciary of an oppor-
tunity to develop a body of property law-perhaps the heart of the
English common law-and indicates that needed authoritative de-
cisions in key areas of national life are currently felt to be more
responsive to the development needs of the state in statutory and
administrative contexts.
The foregoing is stated not to argue that a common law or a
jus gentium will never emerge in most African countries, but to
argue that under present conditions there are substantial obstacles
to such an evolution. However, the adoption by a given African
government of all or some of the options previously discussed as
comprising the alternative to over-reliance on legislation as a
source of law could well improve conditions for the future evolution
of some kind of flexible body of precedent-based national law. The
adoption of intermediate methods of authoritative communication,
symbolized by the Arusha Declaration, in conjunction with the su-
perior courts adopting an active coordinating role, may in time
90 Td. at 202.
91 Id.
92 See VERHELST, supra note 20, at 27. Cf. Mayer & Mayer, Land Law in the
Making, in AFucAN LAW: ADOPTION AN DEVELOPMENT 51, 59 (1965).
93 VzRmEL8T, supra note 20, at 26-27.
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produce the necessary philosophy of law in society and the coherent
body of principles necessary to establish precedents commanding
the respect of judicial or legislative law-makers. Increasing oppor-
tunities in each country for legal education, promoted by most if
not all African governments, currently aim to produce larger num-
bers of magistrates; and, this could well produce in time a judicial
system competent down to the local level to derive legal principles
from the resolution of similar questions. In the future, an equilib-
rium will hopefully be reached in each country as to the role of
customary, received and legislative law that will produce a founda-
tion on which further legal development can be based. 4 Presently,
the English-speaking African countries have and acknowledge the
received tradition of the English common law. Although its substan-
tive and procedural doctrines are currently being severely ques-
tioned, that tradition provides a ready source of judicial strategies
possibly applicable to the evolution of case-derived judicial prece-
dent in each country. In any case, flat predictions about the future
of law in Africa are outrageously dangerous, and none are at-
tempted here.
The essays on Ethiopian land reform and the right to counsel
in South Africa, while setting out elements of the same general
legal dilemma, indicate further that on the way to that particular
crossroads the bridge of coherent prescription must be crossed.
94 T. 0. Elias has argued that the judiciary is the most enduring part of the
British heritage in English-speaking Africa, in that minimum innovation has been
introduced since independence, and has noted specifically: "While the pattern of the
West Coast has been the establishment of an integrated system between the customary
courts and the British-established courts so that a system of appeals runs to the
highest court, the East and Central African pattern has generally been one of parallel
developments between the local or customary courts and the British-established ones,
although integration has been carried far in recent years even in these areas. An
integrated system has the virtue of promoting the gradual evolution of a common
law for each territory." Elias, The Commonwealth in Africa, 31 MODERN L. REV.
284, 300-01 (1968). Further, an independent judiciary in the British sense remains
a live ideal in the majority of these African states. Id. at 301.
It would seem that the success of judicial integration in promoting the evolution
of a common law for each African state rests heavily on the sensitivities of the high
court judges to what is or is not customary law in the area from which the case
originates. If the members of the high bench in fact lack an accurate au courant
knowledge of the customary legal expectations relative to the issues before them,
even if these expectations must be modified in the ensuing decision, there is a great
risk of the attempts to enforce the court judgments actually increasing the lack of
respect for law generally, already noted as a serious problem in development-related
areas, by being (1) basically incomprehensible while triggering demands upon the
people by the State's administrative machinery and (2) irrelevant to the heritage of
the citizens of that region or hostile to their interests (though perhaps of short-term
benefit to a prevailing litigant), and therefore locally perceived as unjust. The
success of judicial integration, in other words, would seem to largely depend on the
fruition of many of the other prerequisites for the evolution of a common law dis-
cussed above.
1970]
UCLA LAW REVIEW
That bridge is constructed of authoritative remedies prescribed to
identify and meet head-on certain basic questions which are sur-
vival issues in that particular society. In Africa many of these
issues relate directly to the maintenance of national unity. Con-
tinuing the metaphor, if that bridge is washed out or otherwise
blocked, then it must be established that legal process can supply
the materials, or at least be included in the building specifications,
to cross the channel to arrive at the originally identified crossroads
of effective implementation. It must be established that the existing
legal system of Ethiopia has some relevance to the problem of
circumventing the entrenched conservatism of Ethiopian land-
owners and military officers so that coherent land reform policies
can be prescribed, a prospect that Professor Dunning concludes is
unlikely. It must be established that the existing legal system dom-
inated by white South Africa has some relevance, minimally through
the judiciary's enforcement of an existing and perhaps expanded
right to counsel vis-h-vis politically motivated pernicious internal
security legislation, to the basic problems of financial and apartheid
factors militating against black South Africans receiving counsel in
the great majority of prosecutions, and ultimately to the even more
basic problem of producing equality for black South Africans in all
areas of life. This prospect is even more unlikely at the present given
current trends in South Africa. 5 These are usually thought of as
"political" problems, and indeed they are. But they are no less
"legal" problems, if for no other reason than that law-makers com-
mitted to basic concepts of equality and national development, once
they have identified the sources of these dilemmas, must wrestle with
the fundamental question of what to do with their time and effort
as people committed to the resolution of social problems by system-
atic, public, consistent and reasonably just authoritative principles
and procedures. To paraphrase the old legal maxim, they may not
forget as lawyers and law-makers what they know as African men.
Whether they should even temporarily abdicate their legal role
when faced with profound identifiable social conflicts is as much a
legal as a political question. Our hope here is that abdication as
such will not occur, though commitment to legal process in general
in their minds or in the public mind may be weakened or sub-
merged for periods of time by overwhelming political forces.
The importance of the essays in this symposium for govern-
ments and others concerned with effective legal process in Africa
seems clear. The majority of black-ruled African states, on issues
95 The profound extent of this unlikelihood is cogently demonstrated in L.
MmtQUARD, THE PEOPLES AND PO.CIES Or SOUTH ArRicA 117-26 (4th ed. 1969).
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analogous to overurbanization and legal integration relative to
competing customary laws and practices, are evolving their own set
of social goals, but with a substantial degree of implementation and
enforcement difficulties, and thus face the crossroads discussed
here. Tanzania might be the country with the most coherent policy
objectives and the most complete public dialog as a basis for strik-
ing out down the second road, in terms of new directions in effective
lawmaking. However, many of the same countries that have defined
goals and policies on the above or other imperative issues of do-
mestic law, stand before the bridge of coherent prescription relative
to certain fundamental questions, such as land reform and the sta-
tus of black people in an apartheid state, which in many cases is in
sad disrepair or washed out altogether. Such bridges must be con-
structed from effective policies prescribed by those of popularly
recognized authority, in fulfillment of generally accepted popular
goals. The building of these bridges is stymied, in states where such
bridges must be built before sustained mass development can
occur, by combinations of vested interests, such as entrenched
landowners allied with the military, in conjunction with the obsta-
cles of underdevelopment, notably illiteracy. In such situations the
government often finds itself whipsawed between the recognized
grave need for reform and its inability under its own procedures to
even agree on a policy for reform. Alternatively, the government,
whose base of power is composed of political forces entrenched in
the status quo and which coloration it willingly adopts, may be even
more elitist than usual. South Africa and Ethiopia stand, respec-
tively, as extreme and recalcitrant examples of vested interests
utilizing power and the concomitants of underdevelopment to wash
out the bridge. And while politically and historically they, along
with the still-existing colonial territories, may be African anachro-
nisms, their dilemmas of legal process and legal development contain
valuable lessons for the rest of Africa.
The essays in this symposium well illustrate the bridge that
must be crossed and locate the crossroads beyond that bridge
where the correct choices must be made by African governments in
order for their legal processes to play a constructive role in national
development.
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